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WEALTH EFFECTS AND EARNINGS PREMIUMS FOR
JOB HAZARDS
W. Kip Viscusi*
I. Introduction

DAM Smith (1937) observed that "the

A

whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labor and
stock must, in the same neighborhood, be
either perfectly equal or continually tending to
equality." If a job poses health and safety risks
that are especially great, a worker will require
higher levels of compensation or greater
non-pecuniary benefits in order for him to
accept the risky job. Despite the fact that the
theory of compensating differentials is almost
two centuries old, it has been only recently that
this theory has been subjected to successful
empiricaltests.'
The purposes of this essay are twofold. First,
in section II, I will formalize the theory of
individual choice among potentially hazardous
jobs for the general situation in which worker
preferences are contingent on the health state
outcome. An important implication of this
analysis is that the job risk that a worker selects
will be negatively related to his wealth. The
second purpose of the investigation is to test
the two principal conceptual hypotheses. The
characteristics of the principal data source to
be used are summarized in section III. The
University of Michigan Survey of Working
Conditions, which is the data set used in the
compensating differentials analysis, provides
very extensive information concerning the
nature of the worker's particular job and his
personal characteristics.Section IV presents the
analysis of the earnings differentials generated
Received for publication November 29, 1976. Revision
accepted for publication May 20, 1977.
* NorthwesternUniversity.
Professors Kenneth Arrow, Richard Freeman, Richard
Zeckhauser,and an anonymous referee provided helpful
comments. The U.S. Department of Labor provided
financial support. This essay is adapted from Viscusi
(1976).
'The recent investigations by Smith (1976) and by
Thaler and Rosen (1976) consider wage premiums for
death risks faced by workers. An earlier study of skill
differentialsis that of Reder (1962).
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by job hazards and other job attributes. In
section V, I consider the responsiveness of the
job risk to a worker's wealth. The empirical
findings, which are consistent with the theoretical predictions, are summarizedin section VI.
II. OptimalChoice among Hazardous
Job Alternatives
Recent economic analyses of choices among
potentially hazardous jobs have generalized
Adam Smith's notion of compensating wage
differentials to probabilistic contexts. The
study by Oi (1973) views adverse job consequences as being tantamount to a drop in
income. He concludes that jobs posing greater
risks will command compensating wage
differentials. A more detailed analysis along
similar lines is presented by Thaler and Rosen
(1976), who develop Oi's approach and also
consider the situation in which individuals face
lotteries on life and death.2The payoff after an
adverse outcome (death) is represented by a
bequest function. The approach taken here also
can be viewed as a probabilistic generalization
of the compensating differential analysis. It
differs in that individuals' utility functions are
assumed to be dependent on one's health state.
The static model in this section illustrates the
propertiesof the optimaljob choice of a worker
who is choosing from a set of job opportunities
that involve the same number of work hours
but have differing probabilities of an adverse
consequence.3This approach does not impose
assumptions that are unduly restrictive since
most job opportunities offer little individual
leeway in the choice of hours.
2Thaler and Rosen (1976) also set up, but do not fully
develop, a more general model in which there are N
possible outcomes.
3Theoretically,there is little that can be said about a
fully generalized multi-attribute case that does not
representa straightforwardextension of this simple model.
Perhaps the most important implication of a generalized
model is that a worker should be cognizant of the entire
portfolio of risky actions and should not make piecemeal
decisions when strong interdependenciesare involved.
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For simplicity, assume that there is no
income uncertainty associated with any particular job. Although the wage rate is known,
the health state resultingfrom one's activities is
determined probabilistically. In this simple
model, one's health does not affect one's
earnings. Two health states will be considered.
State 1 refers to good health, while state 2
refers to ill health, such as being injured. The
individual's objective is to select the job that
maximizes his expected utility.
This formulation of worker preferences
permits the marginal utility of consumption (or
alternatively of wealth) to differ according to
one's health status. An alternative approach of
using a conventional utility function that
depends on wealth alone could be employed in
the job injury context by viewing an injury as
being tantamount to a drop in wealth.
However, if utility functions are assumed to be
of the usual concave 'form, this formulation
would imply that the marginalutility of income
is less when a person is healthy than when he is
not.
The shortcomings of this approach become
particularlyapparent if actuarially fair income
insurance is available. Workers will, of course,
equate the marginalutility of income in the two
possible states. In a model in which health and
safety impacts have monetary equivalents, the
absolute level of the individual'swelfare will be
identical irrespective of the job outcome. If,
however, worker utility functions are allowed
to vary according to the worker'shealth, such a
result need not occur, as lower welfare levels
for the unhealthy state may result.4
The notation to be used in analyzing the
worker'schoice problem is summarizedbelow:
uj = the utility function in health state j,
wherej = 1,2;
x = the composite -consumption good
whose price equals one;
p = the probability of the unattractive
state 2 occurring;
w(p) =the wage for a job offering probability
p of state 2 occurring;
4If the marginal utility of consumption is lower in the
injuredstate, as is plausible, workersfaced with actuarially
fair insurance possibilities will have a lower absolute
welfare level in the injured state when the marginalutility
of consumption is equated for the two states.
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A = initial assets;
A=the shadow price of the goods constraint.
Letter subscriptson the ui and w terms indicate
partial derivatives.The uj's and w(p) functions
are assumed to be continuous and twice
differentiable. The wage schedule w(p) represents the highest wage available for a job with
probability p of injury.5 The worker receives
the same wage for his job irrespective of the
actual health impact. The possibility of
purchasing insurance has been excluded in the
interest of analytic implicity.6 It should be
noted, however, that non-discretionary insurance benefits, such as workmen'scompensation, are not omitted since the state-dependent
utility functions encompass influences such as
these.
Suppose that workers must select from a
range of job alternatives that are equally
attractive in terms of their time allocations but
which offer different probabilities of unfavorable state 2 occurring.This range is assumed to
be continuous and to span all values of p. The
set of alternatives that must be considered can
be restricted to the efficient set of jobs that
offer the highest value of w for any value of p.
The worker's optimal choice from among the
market alternatives is determined by maximizing the Lagrangiangiven by
L = (1 -p)u(x) +pu2(x) + X [x-A - w(p)].
The job with the optimal riskp is determined
by solving the following first-order conditions
for a maximum (as well as the budget
constraint):
Lx=O=(I-p)uX,+puX2+,

(1)

and
L =O=-uP+u2-w
Solving for wpproduces the result
1 u-u2
~>0.

WP

(1p)uX1+puX

(2)

(3
3

5For this static formulation,it does not matter whether
p is uncertain or known with precision. The compensating
differential results generalize with some modification to
multiple periods and instances in which there is worker
learning. See Viscusi (forthcoming).
6The analysis of the role of insurance is presented in
Viscusi (1976).
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The necessary condition for an interior
maximum is that a marginal increase in the
wage as a result of the increased job risk be
positive and equal to the difference in the two
states' utilities divided by the expected marginal utility of consumption.7 Thus the job
market equilibriumfunction w(p) is necessarily
an increasing function of p if workers are
employed at each level of p. Jobs with identical
stochastic properties will be rewarded equally
in equilibrium.8The positive sign of w is a
result of the nature of the job choice problem.
It is not an assumption. The derivation of this
result did not require that workers be risk
averters.The only key assumption requiredwas
that the good health state be more desirable
than the ill health state.9
To assure that a solution to equation (3) is
indeed a maximum, the second-order condition
also must be fulfilled. In mathematical terms,
the marginal rate of change of w with respect
to furtherincreases inp must be either negative
-~~~~
[ ( 1_-p)

dp
. =

dA

w2[( I-puxlx

Uxlx + pUx2x ] Wp -

{(W)

-wp

[

1P)

UX2-UX ]

Uxx

2-UX]
(5

Since the numeratoris clearly positive, the sign
of dp/dA is the same as that of the
denominator. Hazardous jobs will be an
inferior occupational pursuit, as is plausible, if

+pUx2x]

pUX2 +(1p)

[

+ pux2 + 2wpux2- ux 1 + wppx+(-)x

or positive, but not too large:
W

of consumption is diminishing (i.e., uL <0 and
ux2x< 0) and that the marginal utility of
consumption is greaterin the healthy state than
> 0).
in the injured state (i.e., ux> ux2
This model can also be profitably applied to
ascertain the influence of one's initial wealth
on the level of job hazards one will select. The
positive relationshipbetween individual wealth
and the attractiveness of the nonmonetary
attributes of one's job has long been noted by
labor market analysts, such as Reder (1962).
This relationship was recently analyzed by
Weiss (1976) and Thaler and Rosen (1976).
Results in a similar vein can be obtained under
somewhat different assumptions within the
context of the health state model of job choice.
To determine the relationship of one's assets
to the optimal probability of injury, one can
totally differentiate the first-order conditions
(equations (1) and (2) and the budget constraint), and solve for dp/dA using Cramer's
rule, producing the result that

UX}

(4)
The right hand side of equation (4) is positive,
assuming plausible restrictions on the utility
function. In particular, I will assume
throughoutthis section that the marginalutility
7Throughout the rest of this section, I will consider
interior solutions only. The corner solutions are neither
realistic nor analyticallyinteresting.
8No attempt is made here to provide a detailed
discussion of market equilibrium since doing so would
duplicate Thaler and Rosen's (1976) analysis.
9If one uses a model with a single utility function (not
conditional on one's health) in which job risk outcomes
are viewed as monetary equivalents,w is positive so long
as u'> 0 and the argumentof u is greaferwhen the worker
is not injured on the job. This property is quite
unrestrictive and implies nothing whatsoever about the
risk aversion, or lack thereof, on the part of the worker.
For this single-argumentcase, the worker is said to be
risk-averse if u"<O. The second-order conditions for a
maximumimpose other restrictions,but do not requirerisk
aversion. For simplicity, I will assume that the marginal
utility of consumption is diminishing.

u]
wp[(I -p) u.,.+pu.,2.]+ 2wp[ u.,2 UX
(6)
pu +( 1-p)u] < 0.
But if this equation is solved for wa,, the
condition reduces to equation (4)-the secondorder condition for a maximum. Consequently,
the extent of the job hazard one chooses
necessarily decreases with one's wealth. The
problem features guaranteeing this result are
the requirements that the worker be at an
interior maximum and that the utility function
satisfy the seemingly mild restrictions specified
in the discussion of the second-order conditions.
III. The Sample and the Variables
The data source for my investigation of
compensating differentials is the 1969-70
University of Michigan Survey of Working
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TABLE1.-GEOGRAPHICAL,INDUSTRIAL,
AND
OCCUPATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
OFTHESUBSAMPLE

Variable
Location:
Northeast
Southeast and South-Central
Urban

Industry:
Mining
Construction
ManufacturingDurables
Manufacturing Nondurables
Transportation, Communication
and Other Utilities

Wholesale and Retail Trade
MiscellaneousServices
Public Administration

Occupation:
Craftsmen,Foremen and Kindred
Workers
ServiceWorkers
PrivateHousehold Workers
Laborers
Operativesand Kindred

Fraction in
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AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF
TABLE 2.-MEANS
SELECTED VARIABLES IN THE BLUE COLLAR
SUBSAMPLE OF THE MICHIGAN SURVEY OF WORKING
CONDITIONS

the Samplea
.32

Variable

.21
.15

Personal
Background:

.03
.11
.31
.14
.08

.13
.15
.05

AGE
FEMALE
BLACK
EDUC
HEALTH
TENURE

aThe standard deviations of these variables are given by
(m-m 2)-5, where m is the fraction in the sample.

Conditions (SWC). The SWC, which provides
the most detailed information available concerning the nature of the individual'sjob, was a
national survey of 1,533 workers that was
undertaken from December 1969 to January
1970. Farmers and self-employed workers were
excluded from the subsample that I considered
since they did not respond to the job
characteristic questions. In addition, white
collar workers were also excluded from the
analysis since the job characteristic questions
asked were inappropriate for this group.'0
There were 496 full-time blue collar workers in
the subsamplethat was analyzed.
As the data in table 1 indicate, the
subsample being considered reflects substantial
geographical and occupational diversity. The 3
locational categories listed comprise the 0-1
dummy variable list LOCATE. In terms of
industrial distribution, the sample is also fairly
representative,as large numbersof manufacturing and service workers were included in the
survey. The industrialbreakdowngiven is at an
aggregative level. For the empirical analysis, a
finer categorization by SIC code for the
worker'sindustry was used to construct a list of
Results for the pooled blue collar and white collar
sample are reportedin Viscusi (1976).

39.71
0.234
0.123
10.30
0.266
9.09

Standard
Deviation

13.71
a
a

3.03
0.918
10.03

Enterprise
Characteristics:
SIZE
UNION

.34
.17
.01
.05
.43

Mean or Function
in Sample

562.2
0.492

915.3

6809.9
0.522
15.93
0.359

2870.7

a

Job Characteristics:
EARNG
DANGER
INJRA TE
SUPER

a

9.26
a

aThe standard deviations of the 0-1 dummy variables are
omitted since they can be computed from their function m in the
sample, where the standard deviation is (m - m2) 5.

25 0-1 dummy variables that I will refer to as
INDUSTRY. Over three-fourthsof the workers
were either operatives or craftsmen, foremen,
and kindred workers. The first 4 of these
occupational categories were used to construct
the 0-1 dummy variable list JOB.
The characteristicsof the key variables used
in the subsequent analysis are summarized in
table 2. The personal characteristicinformation
available is comparableto that found in several
other large data sets. There is information
pertaining to the worker's age (AGE), sex
(FEMALE), race (BLACK), years of schooling
(ED UC), health limitations (HEALTH),
marital status (SINGLE), and years of experience with the enterprise (TENURE). Since
the survey did not include the worker's
hourly wage rate, I will use the annual earnings from the worker'sprincipaljob (EARNG)
and the natural logarithm of this variable
(LOGEARNG) as the two dependent variables
of interest."
Close to half of the workers are members of
"Differences in worker hours are not of great
importancesince I focus on full-time workers and include
an overtimework variable.The absence of a weeks worked
variable prevents the constructionof a wage variable.
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a union (UNION). Although this fraction is
double the nationwide average for the work
force as a whole, it does not appear disproportionately large for the blue collar, non-farm
population.
The most distinctive feature of the data set is
the extensive information pertaining to the
worker's job: number of employees at the
enterprise (SIZE), union membership (UNION), whether the worker is a supervisor
(SUPER), whether the job requires that the
employee work fast (FAST), whether the
worker is not allowed to make decisions
(NODEC), whether the job requires that the
worker not make mistakes (MISTK), job
overtime work
security (SECURITY),
(OVERT), and training program availability
(TRAIN). These variables pertain to the
worker's particular job, not broadly defined
industrial and occupational groups. The
availability of these job characteristicvariables
enables one to obtain estimates of job risk
premiums that are not subject to the severe
omitted variables bias that might be present if
one included no other job attributes in the
analysis.
The self-assessed danger variable (DANGER) also pertains to the individual's particular job. This job risk measure is the dummy
variable for whether or not the worker's job
exposes him to dangerous or unhealthy conditions. As indicated in table 2, just over half of
the workers considered their jobs to be
hazardous-a result that casts doubt on the
common assumption that workers systematically under-assessjob risks. Detailed examination of the hazards cited revealed that the risks
are consistent with the individual's particular
job. For example, temperature and humidity
extremes are cited by a truck driver for a
canning company, inadequate shoring is listed
by a construction worker, and slippery floors
and footing are cited by a manufacturing
worker in the plastic products industry.
Experimentation with variables pertaining to
the number or type of hazards cited by the
worker did not yield results superior to the
DANGER variable.
The principal advantage of this variable is
that it is not an objective index but rather the
subjectiveassessmentof the risk, the magnitude
that motivates individual behavior. To the

extent that DANGER pertains to the individual's particular job, it is likely to be
subject to less measurement error than would
an average risk figure for the worker'sindustry
or occupation. The principal limitation of the
variable is that it does not reflect the differing
severities and likelihoods of the hazards faced.
Ideally, one would like the subjective probability assessments for a variety of health state
outcomes, not a 0-1 dummy variable pertaining
to the presence of hazards.
An alternative job hazard measure INJRATE will also be employed. This variable is
the number of disabling injuries per million
hours worked in 1969 for the worker's 3-digit
(SIC code) industry.'2The industrial mix of the
workers appears representativesince the mean
value of INJRATE is 15.93, which is slightly
greater than the manufacturingaverage of 14.8
but is less than nonmanufacturing injury rate
levels, such as the 18.4 average for transportation and public utilities.
The relationship between DANGER and
INJRATE is summarized in table 3. The last
column of the table lists the fraction of workers
in each INJRATE interval who consider their
jobs dangerous. As expected, there is a strong
positive relationship between the industry
injury rate and the self-assessed danger
variable. The failure of the DANGER fraction
to be a strictly increasing function of INJRATE throughout may be attributable to the
fact that INJRATE pertains to the average
hazard for the worker'sindustry group, not the
risk posed by his particular job. Moreover,
INJRATE reflects primarily safety hazards
since health risks are not captured in the BLS
TABLE 3.-DANGER ASSESSMENTSAND THE INJURY
RATE FOR THE WORKER'S INDUSTRY

INJRATE (IR)
0 <IR<5
5 < IR < 10
10 < IR < 15
15 < IR < 20
20 < IR < 25
25 < IR < 30
30 < IR < 35
35 < IR < 40
40 < IR

Fraction

DANGER= I
Fraction

Column 3
Column 2

.504
.178
.076
.077
.062
.070
.012
.015
.005

.120
.076
.036
.041
.042
.046
.007
.009
.005

.237
.426
.472
.534
.678
.657
.636
.600
1.00

.2The source of this variable is the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) (1972).
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statistics. In contrast, the hazards included in
DANGER are divided roughly evenly between
health hazards (e.g., noise and noxious fumes)
and safety hazards(e.g., slippery staircases).
IV. An Assessmentof Compensating
EarningsDifferentials
Recent analyses by Thaler and Rosen (1976)
and by Smith (1976) have indicated that
workers in occupations and industries with
higher death rates receive additional wage
compensation.'3 The evidence in this section
provides complementary findings for the two
job risk variables DANGER and INJRATE in
equations in which several other job
characteristicvariables are included in order to
distinguish the influence of job risks per se,
rather than job characteristics correlated with
riskiness.

The two forms of equations to be estimated
are
EARNG= a+

m
E #kXk+

u,

k= 1

and
m

LOGEARNG= a'+

E

Xk+ u'

k= 1

where a and a' are constant terms, /k and Pk'
are coefficients, the Xk's are worker characteristics and job characteristics,and u and u'
are error terms."4 The linear form of the
earnings equation implies a constant supply
price per job characteristic unit, while the
13Smith (1976) utilized the death risk component of the
INJRATE variable used here. His efforts to find positive
and statistically significant wage effects for other variants
of the BLS injury rate variable were unsuccessful. Thaler
and Rosen (1976) employed the incremental death risk
incurred by individuals in relatively hazardous occupations. As Lipsey (1976) noted, this variable compounds
occupational risks and risks correlated with the personal
characteristicsof individualsin particularoccupations.No
job risk variable, including DANGER and INJRATE, is
ideal. Each has its own relative strengthsand weaknesses.
What is clear is that the similarity in the compensating
differentialresults for each of these variables lends strong
support to Adam Smith's claim that more hazardousjobs
will command premiumsin the labor market.
'4The earnings equation can be viewed as part of a
larger recursive system. An attempt was made to estimate
the simultaneous relationship between earnings and job
hazards using two-stage least squares. The results were
consistent with the recursive formulation. See Viscusi
(1976).
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semi-logarithmic form implies a rising supply
price per characteristicunit. The procedure of
viewing worker earnings as being dependent on
the attributes of his job in effect involves the
estimation of a hedonic earnings function,
which is econometrically similar to the hedonic
price index analysis.'5
The regressionresults are reported in table 4.
Equations (1) and (3) include DANGER in the
EARNG and LOGEARNG regressions, respectively, while equations (2) and (4) include the
objective hazard index INJRATE. Equations
(2) and (4) omit the industry dummy variable
list since INJRATE is the industry injury rate
matched to the workers in the sample using
their industryresponses.
The coefficients for the first ten variables in
the equations, which represent personal and
enterprise characteristics, reflect familiar patterns of influence. Better educated workers
earn more, as do those who belong to a union.
Females and workers with health impairments
earn less. The magnitudes of the effects often
are less than are usually found since much of
the impact of these exogenous variables is
indirect via the job characteristic variables,
such as whether the workeris a supervisor.'6
The two job risk variables each reflect
positive and statistically significant earnings
premiums for hazardous work.'7 The results in
equation (1) indicate that workers on jobs
perceived as being dangerous earn an annual
earnings premium of $375. Although this
amount representsonly 5.5%of workers' mean
earnings of $6,810, the low level of compensation is not implausible in view of the large
percentage of workers (52.2%)who claim that
their jobs expose them to dangerous or
unhealthy conditions.
An instructive check on the plausibility of
the level of the job risk premium is to compare
its magnitude with the average premium
implied by INJRATE. Equation (2) indicates
that workers receive an additional $26 for a
one point increase in the frequency of disabling
15For a survey of the hedonic price index literature,see
Griliches (1971).
'6The reduced form estimates are more comparable to
the results in the human capital literature.
17Throughout this analysis, references to statistical
significance refer to tests at the 5%level. The value of t.95
for a one-tailed t-test with an infinite sample size is 1.645.
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TABLE 4.-EARNG AND

LOGEARNGREGRESSION RESULTS
Coefficients and StandardErrors

Independent
Variables
AGE
AGE x AGE
FEMALE

EARNG
2
+ 163.74
(44.40)

-1.63
(0.53)

-1.96
(0.51)

-2585.9

(278.9)
BLA CK

LOGEARNG

1
+ 138.22
(45.50)

-382.38

-2809.3

(244.8)
-429.00

3
+.025
(.0072)

4
+.030
(.0070)

-.28E-3
(.083E-3)

-.34E-3
(.082E-3)

-.507

-.534

(.044)
-.063

(.039)
-.067

(276.19)

(269.54)

(.044)

(.043)

EDUC

+ 128.84
(33.34)

+ 136.14
(32.76)

+.024
(.0053)

+.025
(.0052)

HEALTH

-194.91

- 168.92

-.019

-.017

(93.88)
SINGLE
SIZE
UNION
TENURE
DANGER

-1088.6
(343.9)
+ 0.233
(0.119)

(93.14)

(.015)

(.015)

-981.16
(328.75)

-.231
(.054)

-.210
(.052)

+ .25E-4
(.19E-4)

+ .38E- 4
(.16E-4)

+.109
(.033)

+.113
(.031)

-.13E-3
(1.78E-3)

-.0015
(.0017)

+ 0.305
(0.104)

+543.07
(206.88)

+645.05
(196.53)

+12.40
(11.28)

+6.25
(10.87)

+374.82
(177.67)

INJRA TE

-

+.055
(.028)

+26.37

+.0040

(10.14)

(.0016)

SUPER

+372.24
(193.89)

+414.69
(191.43)

+.032
(.031)

+.043
(.030)

FAST

+519.54
(189.64)

+460.82
(184.22)

+.072
(.030)

+.063
(.029)

NODEC

-121.78
(83.85)

-146.67
(82.38)

-.016
(.013)

-.021
(.013)

MISTK

-127.91

-140.29

-.023

-.027

(85.31)

(82.79)

(.013)

(.013)

SECURITY

+ 521.27
(177.90)

+496.28
(172.06)

+.093
(.028)

+.097
(.027)

OVERT

+170.12
(67.41)

+191.76
(64.66)

+.032
(.011)

+.037
(.010)

TRAIN

+362.08
(201.14)

+ 519.59
(193.27)

+.059
(.032)

+.099
(.031)

Other
Variables

LISTI

LIST2

LISTI

LIST2

R2
S.E.E.

.641
1813.5

.611
1836.6

.698
.286

.669
.291

Note: Each equation also includes the variable lists LOCATE and JOB. Equations(1) and (3) also include industrydummy variable
list INDUSTRY, which is omitted from the equations including INJRATE since this job risk index was constructed using information
regardingthe worker'sindustry.
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work injuries per million hours worked. Since
the average value of INJRATE is 15.93, the
mean level of annual earnings compensation
for injuries is $420. This amount is only $45
more than was implied by the DANGER
variable-a discrepancy that is wvellwithin the
bounds of error. Both job hazard variables
indicate an average level of compensation for
riskyjobs of about $400 annually in 1969.
The other job characteristic variables included in the regressions serve two functions.
First, they control for a variety of job
attributes, thus reducing the bias in the job
hazard variables' coefficients. Second, they
provide additional tests of the validity of the
theory of compensating differentials.
The coefficients associated with these
variables reflect the expected patterns of
influence. Supervisors(SUPER) are paid more,
as are employees whose jobs require them to
work fast (FAST), who work overtime
(OVERT), or who work for enterprises with
training programs (TRAIN). Workers who do
not make decisions (NODEC) and whose jobs
require them not to make mistakes (MISTK)
tend to be paid somewhat less, which is
consistent with the lighter tasks and lower level
assembly line work associated with these
characteristics. The only variable with a sign
opposite of what one might expect on the basis
of the compensating differentials analysis is
SECURITY. However, the higher earnings of
individuals with job security is quite consistent
with the greater security associated with upper
level blue collar positions. This variable thus
may be capturingprimarilythe relative ranking
of the worker'sjob rather than any particular
job attribute that is not appropriatelycompensated.
V. The Role of WorkerAssets
The second major prediction of the conceptual analysis is that the optimal job risk will
necessarily decrease with the worker's wealth,
provided that certain mild restrictions on the
worker's preferences and employment opportunities are imposed. The validity of this result
cannot be tested using the SWC data since the
survey did not include a worker wealth
variable. One can, however, use the 1969 data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of
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Mature Men in conjunction with the 1969 BLS
industry injury rates to ascertain whether there
is any systematic relationship between the
injury rate of the worker's industry and his
wealth.
The sample to be considered consists of
1,932 males who were 45-59 years old when the
survey began in 1966 and had a mean age of
53.7 in 1969. The dependent variable for the
analysis is INJRA TE. The independent
variables used either have the same definitions
as do the SWC variables (AGE, EDUC) or else
are self-explanatory (NONWHITE). The explanatory variable of greatest interest is
ASSETS, which is the worker's net asset
position. ASSETS has a mean value of $21,717.
Table 5 reports the regression results.
A'SSETS has a statistically significant
coefficient with the expected sign. The magnitude of the effect is rathersmall, however, since
these results imply that the elasticity of the
industry injury frequency rate with respect to
worker wealth is only -0.011. This finding is
likely to understate the wealth effect since it
captures the influence of wealth only on the
worker's choice of an industry. One might
expect that much of the wealth effect would be
reflected in the individual's occupation or
particularjob within the industry. It should be
noted that the direction rather than the
magnitude of the impact is of central concern
since the negative elasticity estimate provides
additional support of the validity of the overall
conceptualizationof individual choice.
TABLE 5.-REGRESSION OF INJRATE ONASSETS
AND OTHER PERTINENTVARIABLES

AGE

-0.018
(0.052)

NONWHITE

-1.38
(0.499)

EDUC

-0.629
(0.063)

ASSETS

-0.81E-5
(0.38E-5)

R2

0.090

S.E.E.

8.91

F

15.83

Note: Other variables included were an area unemployment
variable, 3 regional dummies, 1 SMSA dummy, union membership,and health status. The sample size was 1,932.
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VI. Conclusions
The conceptual analysis of individual choice
among potentially hazardous jobs indicated
that the optimaljob risk for a worker should be
negatively related to his wealth and that
workers will demand earnings premiums for
hazardous jobs-a result originally articulated
by Adam Smith. The empirical analysis
provided strong support for these conceptual
results. The annual earnings premium for job
hazards averaged $400 in 1969. This value is
not particularly low in view of the large
number of workers who viewed their jobs as
being hazardous. The injury rate for an
employee's industry also was negatively related
to worker assets, although the effect was not as
large as one would expect if more appropriate
data were available to evaluate the magnitude
of this relationshin.
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